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Abstract— In this paper an automatic deception detection 
system, which analyses participant deception risk scores from 
non-verbal behaviour captured during an interview conducted 
by an Avatar, is demonstrated. The system is built on a 
configuration of artificial neural networks, which are used to 
detect facial objects and extract non-verbal behaviour in the 
form of micro gestures over short periods of time. A set of 
empirical experiments was conducted based a typical airport 
security scenario of packing a suitcase. Data was collected 
through 30 participants participating in either a truthful or 
deceptive scenarios being interviewed by a machine based 
border guard Avatar. Promising results were achieved using 
raw unprocessed data on un-optimized classifier neural 
networks. These indicate that a machine based interviewing 
technique can elicit non-verbal interviewee behavior, which 
allows an automatic system to detect deception.  
Keywords- neural networks, avatar, deception detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Border control officers’ tasks rely on bilateral human 
interaction such as interviewing an individual traveller using 
verbal and non-verbal communication to both provoke 
response and interpret the traveler’s responses. Automated 
pre-arrival screening could greatly reduce the amount of time 
a participant spends at the border crossing point and may 
improve security control. Such a system would complement 
existing border control technology such as Advanced 
Passenger Information systems and future systems such as 
the new Entry/Exit System centralized border management 
system which will facilitate the automation of border control 
process (due for implementation in 2020) [1].  
 This paper presents initial work on an Automated Deception 
Detection system known as ADDS which is powered by a 
conversational agent avatar and is capable of quantifying the 
degree of deception on the part of the interviewee. ADDS 
forms part of the iBorderCtrl  (Intelligent Portable Control 
System) [2] whose aim is to enable faster and more thorough 
border control for third country nationals crossing the land 
borders of EU Member States (MS) [2,3].  The final version 
of ADDS will utilize an advanced border control agent avatar 
which conducts an interview with a traveller. The avatar 
attitudes will be personalized to communicate with the 
traveler including utilizing subtle non-verbal communication 
cues to stimulate richer responses from them. A strong focus 
will be on identifying the impact on non-verbal 
communication expressed by the avatar on the performance 
of ADDS. 
   Nonverbal behaviour is used by humans to communicate 
messages, which are transmitted through visual and auditory 
features such as facial expressions, gaze, posture, gestures, 
touch and non-linguistic vocal sounds [4]. A human being 
continually transmits nonverbal behavior, which can be 
produced subconsciously, in contrast to spoken language. 
The majority of work on the use of non-verbal behaviour 
(NVB) to determine a specific cognitive state has been 
undertaken by human observers, who are often prone to 
fatigue and produce different subject opinions. Hence, an 
automated solution is preferable. Related, but limited work 
has been done in the automated extraction of NVB from a 
learning system [5] to detect comprehension levels and also 
in detection of guilt and deception [6, 7]. Both of these 
examples have used artificial neural networks to first detect 
micro gesture patterns and then perform classification 
successfully.  
Time is also a factor, as interviewers need to interact longer 
with travelers to reach a conclusion on their deception intent. 
Such time comes at a premium in border control, resulting in 
short and potentially false positive results in the field. An 
automated system, which utilizes a few minutes of traveler 
time at the pre-crossing stage without increasing the amount 
of time they spend with a border control agent, could thus 
potentially increase efficacy while reducing cost. In this work 
deception detection in ADDS is performed by an 
implementation of the patented Silent Talker artificial 
intelligence based deception detector [6, 7]. 
   The aim of research presented in this paper was to firstly  
produce a prototype trained artificial neural network (ANN) 
classifier to be used within the automatic deception detection 
system; secondly to investigate whether an avatar, machine 
based interviewing technique could be developed for a border 
security application which requires large volumes of 
interviews. Thus, the research question addressed in this 
paper can be stated as:  
 
Can a machine based interviewing technique elicit non-
verbal behavior, which allows an automatic system to detect 
deception? 
 
This paper is organized as follows; Section II provides a 
description of prior work in the field of deception detection 
systems with emphasis on automation. The use of 
conversational agents is also examined in the border control 
context in terms of being used as avatar interviewers. Section 
III describes the ADDs system.  Section IV presents the 
overall methodology of the data collection process and 
describes a series of border control scenarios, which are used 
to simulate truthful and deceptive behaviour of participants. 
Results and findings of a series of experiments are 
highlighted in Section V.  Section VI presents the conclusions 
and future directions. 
II. PRIOR WORK  
   A) Deception Detection Systems 
 
   Human interest in detecting deception has a long history. 
The earliest records date back to the Hindu Dharmasastra of 
Gautama, (900 – 600 BC) and the Greek philosopher 
Diogenes (412 – 323 BC) according to Trovillo (1939). 
Today, the best-known method is the Polygraph [8], which 
was invented, by John Augustus Larson in 1921, to detect lies 
by measuring physiological changes related to stress. The 
Polygraph is a recording instrument, which displays 
physiological changes such as pulse rate, blood pressure, and 
respiration, in a form where they can be interpreted by a 
trained examiner as indicating truthful or deceptive 
behaviour. A polygraph test takes a minimum of 1.5 hours 
but can take up to four hours depending on the issue being 
tested for [8]. Individual scientific studies can be found which 
support [9] or deny [10] the validity of the Polygraph. A 
meta-study [11] conducted in 1985 found 10 studies from a 
pool of 250 were sufficiently rigorous to be included. From 
these they concluded that under very narrow conditions, the 
Controlled Question Test (CQT - the standard Polygraph test 
that could be used at border crossings) could perform 
significantly better than chance, but these results would still 
contain substantial numbers of false positive, false negative 
and inconclusive classifications. They also stated that many 
conditions needed to achieve this might be beyond the control 
of the examiner. Constructing a good set of control questions 
for this test requires substantial information about the 
interviewee's background, occupation, work record and 
criminal record to be collected before the exam. The 
polygraph requires physiological sensors on the traveler that 
would make both the set-up time and cost of an interview 
prohibitively expensive to apply to all travelers, thus typically 
if it is used, it is at a secondary stage for high-risk travelers.  
   Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a 
technique that measures changes in activity of areas of the 
brain indirectly by measuring blood flow (which changes to 
supply more oxygen to active areas of the brain). It has been 
proposed that there are reliable relationships between patterns 
of brain activation and deception that can be measured by 
fMRI. It has also been reported that although fMRI is seen as 
overcoming some weaknesses of the Polygraph, for example 
by having an explanatory model based on cognitive load [12]  
it is highly vulnerable to countermeasures (in common with 
EEG-based approaches). 
   Voice Stress Analysis (VSA) is a technique that analyses 
physical properties of a speech signal as opposed to the 
semantic content. The technique is fundamentally based on 
the idea that a deceiver is under stress when telling a lie and 
that the pitch of the voice is affected by stress. More 
specifically, it claims that micro tremors, small frequency 
modulations in the human voice, are produced by the 
automatic or involuntary nervous system when an 
interviewee is lying. There have also been claims that the 
increased cognitive load of deception creates micro tremors 
[13]. The weight of scientific analysis is that, whatever the 
assumed underlying model, VSA performs no better than 
chance and has been described as “charlatanry” [14]. 
   The most recent work in this area is contained in the 
INTERSPEECH 2016 Computational Para-linguistics 
Challenge: Deception, Sincerity & Native Language. 
Inspection of a sample of responses to the 2016 challenge 
shows them to be either paralinguistic, phonemic or a 
combination of the two, e.g. the Low Level Descriptors such 
as psychoacoustic spectral sharpness or phonetic features 
such as phonemes [15]. These techniques achieved 
approximately 67% using a technique called “Unweighted 
Average Recall” intended to take account of the fact that the 
Deceptive Speech Database (DSD) (dataset) from the 
University of Arizona was unbalanced (test set contained 
24% deceptive / 76% truthful classes). We have not found 
evidence of a significant degree of paralinguistic research 
outside English. 
   Facial micro-expressions are short-lived, unexpected 
expressions. There is said to be a small “universal” set of 
expressions of extreme emotion: disgust, anger, fear, sadness, 
happiness, surprise, and contempt, meaning they are common 
across cultures. A formalized method of encoding micro 
expressions was defined by Paul Ekman, who developed 
commercial tools for training interviewers to recognize them 
[16]. One of the resources is a manual on a Facial Action 
Coding System for training in expression recognition. This 
has generated a large body of research in automating FACS 
for applications such as lie detection Virtually all of the 
findings from micro expression studies are closer to a CKT 
than genuine lie detection, so they do not constitute 
persuasive evidence for using the technique at border 
crossings. 
 
B) Automated Deception Detection 
 
Silent Talker (ST) was designed to answer the criticisms 
of the psychology community that there are no meaningful 
single non-verbal indicators of deception (such as averted 
gaze), by combining information from many (typically 40) 
fine-grained nonverbal channels simultaneously and learning 
(through Artificial Neural Networks) to generalize about 
deceptive NVB from examples [6, 7]. In this respect, it does 
not depend on an underlying explanatory model in the same 
way as other lie detectors. However, it does have a conceptual 
model of NVB. This model assumes that certain mental states 
associated with deceptive behaviour will drive an 
interviewee’s NVB when deceiving. These include Stress or 
Anxiety (factors in psychological Arousal), Cognitive Load, 
Behavioral Control and Duping Delight. Stress and Anxiety 
are highly related, if not identical states. The key feature of 
ST, as a machine learning system, is that it takes a set of 
candidate features as input and determines itself which 
interactions between them, over time, indicated lying. Thus 
is not susceptible to errors caused by whether particular 
psychologists are correct about particular NVB gestures.  
Evidence to date is that no individual feature can be 
identified as a good indicator, only ensembles of features 
over a time interval provide effective classification. Early 
experiments with ST showed classification rates of between 
74% and 87% (p<0.001) depending on the experimental 
condition [6]. There are no single, simple indicators of 
deception; ST uses complex interactions between multiple 
channels of microgestures over time to determine whether the 
behaviour is truthful or deceptive. A microgesture is a very 
fine-grained non-verbal gesture, such as the movement one 
eye from fully-open to half-open. This gesture could be 
combined with the same eye moving from half-open to closed 
indicating a wink or blink. Over a time interval, e.g. 3 
seconds, complex combinations of microgestures can be 
mined from the interviewee’s behaviour. Microgestures are 
significantly different from micro-expressions (proposed in 
other systems), because they much more fine-grained and 
require no functional psychological model of why the 
behaviour has taken place [6].  
 
C) Conversational Agents in the Border Control context. 
 
A Conversational Agent (CA) is an AI system that engages a 
human user in conversation to achieve some practical goal, 
usually a task perceived as challenging by the user. Embodied 
CAs offer the opportunity of more sophisticated 
communication through gesture and supplementing the 
dialogue with non-verbal communication [17]. The persona 
of an embodied CA is referred to as an Avatar and there is 
(limited) evidence supporting the use of an Avatar 
interviewer for automated border crossing control.  
Nunamaker [18] reported a group of experiments, 
culminating in an attempt to smuggle a concealed bomb past 
an avatar interviewer. These, collectively, suggest that an 
avatar can simulate affective signals during dialogue, can 
have a definable persona (gender, appearance) and can elicit 
cues to deception. In practice, such systems tend to rely on 
vocal features [18] or electrodermal activity and measure 
arousal as a proxy for deception. Hooi & Cho [19] have 
reported that perceived similarity of appearance between the 
avatar and interviewee reduces deceptive behaviour. 
Furthermore, Strofer et al. [20] observed that when 
interviewees believe that the avatar they are interacting with 
is controlled by a human, they produce more physiological 
responses (electrodermal), e believed to indicate deception. 
In a cognitive neuroscience review, de Borts and deGelder 
[21]  reported that human-like avatars that move realistically 
are more likeable and perceived as similar to real humans. 
This prior work suggests a strong potential for the use of 
avatars in border control interviews and the need for 
substantial research into the influential factors. The state of 
the art of this combination of technologies suggest that 
Avatars will be suitable for detecting deception in border 
crossing interviews, as they are effective extractors of 
information from humans [22] and therefore can applied to 
deception detection tasks. Secondly, they can provide 
dynamic responses to user inputs and can simulate affective 
signals [23].  
    
III. AUTOMATIC DECEPTION DETECTION SYSTEM 
 
Figure 1 presents an abstract of the ADDS architecture as 
seen from within the final iBorderCtrl system. Each traveler 
who engages with the function of pre-traveller registration 
will be required (subject to providing informed consent) to 
undertake an interview with an avatar. In the final system the 
Avatar will adapt its attitude based upon the level of 
deception detected by ADDS on a question by question basis. 
For the purpose of training the neural network classifiers 





Fig.1. Automated Deception Detection System Architecture 
 
Also, for the purpose of the research conducted in this paper, 
the traveler information for the simulated border crossing 
interview will be captured  through a series of scenarios (for 
deceptive participants), and a post experiment questionnaire. 
This information will then be used to populate a local 
database. In practice, the ADDS API will receive encrypted 
information about a specific traveller from the iBorderCtrl 
control system database and populate an instance of a 
trip/traveller in the ADDS back end database server.  
Classification was performed by the Silent Talker component 
of ADDS using an empirically determined risk level. The 
silent Talker component outputs the score for each of the 
questions and associated classification, the whole interview 
(score and classification) and the confirmation radio button 
responses. This updated the ADDS back end database server.  
In the final system, the ADDS Control module will use the 
risk scores to change the avatar attitude when the next 
question is asked to the traveller. In this work, the risk scores 
and classifications were simply stored in the ADDS local 
database for training, testing and validating the neural 
network classifiers.  
 
A) Silent Talker 
 
This work is specifically focused on the application specific 
development of the Silent Talker (ST) system (Fig.2.). ADDS 
utilizes 38 input channels to the deception network. They fall 






Fig.2. Silent Talker component in ADDS  
ST uses features extracted from the non-verbal behaviour 
(NVB) of interviewees to determine whether they are lying 
or telling the truth. In this study, the application specific ST  
first receives a video stream (mobile app or web client) being 
received for classification  The video arrives as a sequence of 
frames, each frame is processed in sequence and information 
from the frames is compiled  or accumulated for the purpose 
of  classification. The deception classifiers used in this paper 
are multi-layer perceptrons producing a continuous output in 
the range -1 to +1. Empirically determined thresholding of 
this output was used for the truthful and deceptive 
classifications. The consequence of this is that some frame 
sequences will be labelled as “unclassifiable.”  If a single 
decision boundary were used, these would have outputs too 
close to the decision boundary to justify confidence in them. 
A simplified description of the components in Figure 2 now 
follows: 
 
Object Locators: Each object locator finds the position of a 
particular object, (e.g. the head, the left eye, the right eye etc.) 
in the current video frame.  A typical object locator would 
consist of a back propagation Artificial Neural network 
(ANN) trained with samples extracted from video collected 
during a training experiment. 
 
Pattern Detectors: Pattern detectors detect particular states 
of objects located by the object locators. For example, for the 
left eye: left eye closed is true when the left eye is closed (1), 
otherwise false (0), left eye half closed is true when the left 
eye is half closed (1), otherwise false (0), the left eye may be 
considered open if neither of these pattern detectors is true. 
 
Channel Coder: The variations in the state of an object 
determined by specific pattern detector are referred to as a 
“channel”. Channel coding is the process of collecting these 
variations over a specific time period (i.e. over a specific 
number of video frames). 
 
Group Channel Coders: Group channel coders refers to the 
process of amalgamating and statistically summarizing the 
information from the individual channel coders to form a 
summary vector, which can be input to the final deception 
classifier. 
 
Deception Classifiers: Typically, the deception classifier is a 
single ANN trained to classify input vectors from the group 
channel coders as either truthful or deceptive. It is also 
possible to add other classifiers (for example to detect feeling 
of guilt) and combine these to obtain higher deception 




The final ADDS system will use animation to pose each 
question which will be personalized for each border guard 
avatar in accordance with the travelers non-verbal state. A 
sample of a border guard avatar posing a question can be 
found here: http://stremble.com/iBorderCtrl/1/1/1/1.mp4).  
However as the development of ADDS, as a system was 
happening in parallel to the training and validation of the 
deception detection element, a still image of the male avatar 
developed by Stremble [24] was used within this work 
(Figure 3).  The avatar is presented in a uniform to convey an 
air of authority. In this experiment, the avatar is shown as a 
still image and the speech is synthesized. One reason for this 
was to see if any emotional states were conferred on the 




Fig.3. Male Avatar 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
This section describes the methodology to conduct a 
quantitative empirical study of non-verbal behaviour with 
samples of volunteer participants concerning truthful and 
deceptive conditions. The hypothesis tested was:  
 
H0: A machine based interviewing technique cannot be used 
to detect deception from non-verbal behaviour 
H1:  A machine based interviewing technique can be used to 
detect deception from non-verbal behaviour at levels 
statistically greater than chance. 
 
A) Overview of  data collection process 
 
Following an approved ethical process, data was collected 
through participants first performing a simulated deception 
task using different levels of arousal by varying the task. This 
was followed by a recorded interview by the Avatar Border 
Guard to collect video data for analysis of non-verbal 
behaviour. On completion of the interview, participants 
completed a questionnaire containing simple subjective self-
ratings of internal mental states. The experiment utilised a 
number of scenarios in order to test the hypothesis. The two 
major categories are Scenario Truthful and Scenario 
Deceptive.   
 
S1: Scenario Truthful 
• All participants will use their true identities as recorded 
in their identification documents.  
• All participants will answer questions about a real 
relative or friend who is an EU / UK citizen (equivalent 
of a Sponsor in border questions asked by EU border 
guards).  
• All participants will pack a suitcase with harmless items 
typical of going on a holiday  
• Participants will answer questions about identity, 
sponsor and suitcase contents. 
• All answers to questions can be answered truthfully. 
Scenarios Deceptive  
• All participant given fake identities (male / female) and 
short life history.  
• All participants are given a short description of a fake 
relative from the EU. 
• Participants are stratified into 1 of 4 blocks. These blocks 
are intended to have different degrees of emotional 
intensity / deceptive stakes (in decreasing order of 
intensity). 
o S2: Simulated biohazard infectious disease in 
test tube with informational video about 
weaponization 
o S3: Simulated biohazard infectious disease in 
test tube without informational video 
o S4: Simulated Drug package (soap powder in 
clear packet) 
o S5: Simulated Forbidden agriculture/ food 
product i.e. seeds. 
• Participants will answer questions about identity, 
sponsor and suitcase contents. 
 
All participants engaged in truthful or deceptive scenarios 
were required to pack a suitcase. The standard items relevant 
to both deceptive and truthful scenarios that are packed are: a 
pair of unisex trousers, a T-shirt, shower gel, a tube of 
toothpaste, a hand towel and a bottle of perfume in a box. If 
a participant took part in a deceptive scenario, then an 
intervention by a confederate took place that involved the 
confederate modifying the contents of the perfume box with 
a prohibited item depending on the scenario (S2.S5). The 
participant was also shown typical posters of prohibited items 
from airport baggage handling areas.  
   The experimental methodology comprised a pre-interview 
task which sets up the scenario for truth-telling or deception, 
the interview itself and a debriefing stage which will include 
certain ethics aspects (confirmation of consent, permissions 
to use materials etc.) and some subjective ratings of feelings 
during the interview (e.g. subjective guilt etc.). Each 
participant was taken in to the debriefing room and asked to 
read the participant information sheet, invited to ask any 
questions and then sign the first part of the participant 
informed consent document. In the debriefing session, 
participants completed the second part of the informed 
consent form to confirm they still consented to their data to 
be used in the study. 
B) Questions for scenario 
Table I shows the questions that all participants answered 
during the experiment. Some of the questions come from the 
set of questions actually asked by border guards at the border 
crossing point. However, many of these questions are not 
practical to ask in the experimental scenario. Therefore, a 
methodology was devised to substitute a minimum-sized set 
of proxy questions, which cover the same psychological / 
cognitive properties. This was found by analyzing a set of 
questions that were provided by experts from the Hungarian 
National Police Polish Border Guards, State Border Guard of 
the Republic of Latvia and TRAINOSE (Greece). 
 




1 What is your family name? 
2 What is in your case? 
3 Have you seen any posters of prohibited items? 
4 Are there any items from the lists of prohibited items in 
your case? 
5 How many items are in the case? 
6 If you open the case and show me what is inside, will it 
confirm that your answers were true? 
7 What is your first name? 
8 When were you born? 
9 Where were you born? 
10 What is your current citizenship? 
11 Please tell me the name of a friend or family member who 
can confirm your identity? 
12 What is the relationship of this person to you? 
13 Where does this person live? 
C) Interview conducted using Wizard of Oz Methodology 
Collection of data to train the deception detection component 
of ADDS uses the established “Wizard of Oz” methodology. 
In this method (figure 4) a human, called the “Wizard” 
manually controls a simulated Avatar to create an experiment 
which is experienced (as closely as possible) by the 
participants as if they were being interviewed by a real 
Avatar.  In this experiment, the Wizard operated a web app 
via Wi-Fi, which controlled the display on the participant’s 
screen. The Wizard has access to a GUI allowing the 
selection of questions that are played in a window on the 
participant’s screen. During the experiment:   
• The participant aligned their face with the camera using 
on screen instructions.  
• The simulated Avatar maintained a neutral expression  
• The questions were delivered verbally to the participant 
by the static avatar through text to speech recordings. 
• Video of the participant was captured on a question-by-
question basis and stored for the purposes of training and 
testing.  
The start time of the question is recorded as when the Avatar 
starts speaking. Once the participant has finished answering 
the question, the Wizard clicks to progress to the next 
question.  The time of this click was recorded as the end of a 
question. The wizard also had the option of repeating a 




Fig. 4. The Wizard-of-Oz (WoZ) experiment 
 
D) Group design and stratification  
 
The video data of participants was recorded using the 
questions presented in Table I and are automatically 
cropped/segmented into question-by-question video files. 
Table II shows the dataset for truthful and deceptive 
participants. The data is captured using the built-in web-cam 
with the default video resolution of 640*480 and 30 frames 
per second (fps). The channel data is extracted from each 
question using a fixed sliding window (slot) of 1 second (i.e. 
30 frames) to hold sufficient information of the channel 
states. Each slot is considered a single vector encoding the 
information/states for 38 channels. A sample size of 32 
participants is used similar to other comparable studies[6]. 
   Furthermore, the vector is considered only if it is extracted 
from a valid slot. A valid slot always consists of the channel 
information for face and both eyes. Detailed explanation of 
slot validity is explained in previous work [6]. 
 
Table II: Experimental Dataset  
No. of Question per Interview 13 
Total Participants 32 (17 Deceptive, 15 
Truthful) 
Total number of video files 448 
Deceptive participants Male (10)  
Female (7),  
Asian/Arabic (4) 
EU White (13) 
Truthful Participants Male (12),  
Female (3)  
Asian/Arabic (6), 
EU White (9) 
No of Channel Analyzed 38 
Total number of  truthful vectors in dataset 43051 




Two strategies were employed for training, testing and 
validation: Bootstrapping and Leave one out which are 
described version in section V.  These were used to develop 
suitable Artificial Neural Networks for the channels and 
stages shown in figure 2. The final classifying ANN (i.e. 
deception classifiers) produces an activation, which is 
thresholded to determine truthfulness or deceptiveness. This 
was not dynamic (i.e. continuously adaptive) but was 
optimized manually, based on the suitcase experiment data. 
Further manual optimization will be carried out after initial 
runs of the pilot. Deception risk scores obtained from the 
deception classifiers are bipolar in the range [-1, 1], where 
deceptive is +1 and truthful is -1. The deception score for a 
question is calculated as: 
 	 ∑                                                                 (1) 
 
Where, Dq is the deception risk score of current question, ds 
is the deception score of slot s and n is the total number of 
valid slots for the current question. Then the thresholding is 
applied as stated below: 
 
IF Question_risk (Dq) <= x THEN 
  Indicates truthful 
ELSE IF Question_risk (Dq)  >= y THEN 
 Indicates deception  
ELSE 
 Indicates unknown 
END IF 
 
Where x and y are determined empirically. Initial values were 
set too x = -0.05 and y = +0.05. Values between x and y are 
unknown and a classification cannot be obtained. This 
indicates that the final decision for the question classification 
(i.e. truthful/deceptive) is made regardless of the quantity of 
valid slots. In other words, a question is classified as 
unknown when there is no single valid slot that exists (i.e. n 
= 0) or the  value lies in between x and y.  
 
V. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
A) Initial Results     
The dataset obtained from the group channel coders is fed 
into the deception classifier that firstly used the 10-fold cross-
validation strategy for train/validate/test the networks. The 
percentage split of the entire input data for training, 
validation and testing was 70:20:10 percent respectively. 
There are 38 inputs to the network with one hidden layer and 
single output. Networks are trained on varying number of 
neurons (i.e. 11-20 in these experiments) in the hidden layer 
to observe the impact on the performance. A bipolar sigmoid 
transfer function is used while training the networks. 
Maximum number of epochs are set to 10,000. The aim of 
this initial work is to establish whether a machine based 
interviewing technique can be used to detect deception from 
non-verbal behaviour, and there was no tuning of the 
classifiers attempted. With the exception of removing 
redundant duplicated vectors, the initial results presented in 
Table III and Table IV are derived from raw unprocessed 
data.  
   Table III shows the percentage accuracy of the deception 
classifiers obtained using a varying number of neurons in the 
hidden layer and the aforementioned parameter settings. It is 
observed that the network performance is gradually increased 
while increasing the number of neurons. The highest 
training/validation/test average accuracy indicated 96.55% 
and 96.78% in terms of truthful and deceptive classification 
respectively with 20 neurons in the hidden layer. The trained 
networks with the optimum classification accuracy are then 
further used for the testing on unseen dataset. 
 
B) Testing classifiers 
   The strategy used for testing the classifiers is based on 
leaving one pair out (i.e. one truthful and one deceptive 
participant) for testing while training and validating the 
networks on the rest of the participants’ data (30 
participants). Then the trained networks performance was 
tested using the unseen data of two participants. To examine 
the effect of totally unseen participants, 9 experimental runs 
were conducted, each involving the random selection of a 
pair of test participants (one truthful, one deceptive). Table 
IV shows the average test accuracy was measured to be 
73.66% for deceptive tests and 75.55% for the truthful tests. 
Table III: Results using 10 Fold Cross Validation 




Training  Validation  Test  
T D T D T D 
11 94.13 95.04 93.68 94.41 94.30 93.69 
12 94.45 95.63 93.75 94.74 93.62 94.96 
13 94.92 95.77 94.41 95.14 94.31 95.15 
14 94.85 96.26 94.29 95.67 94.23 95.46 
15 96.19 96.19 95.40 95.50 95.50 95.41 
16 96.16 96.40 95.58 95.80 95.45 95.91 
17 96.56 96.98 95.90 96.32 95.75 96.22 
18 96.81 97.17 96.14 96.52 95.91 96.28 
19 97.23 97.11 96.48 96.48 96.67 96.45 
20 97.28 97.50 96.53 96.81 96.55 96.78 
These outcomes indicate a substantial decrease in the 
classification accuracy when compared with the 
classification outcomes presented in Table III. When using 
10-fold cross-validation, the classifiers have seen some of the 
material (i.e. image vectors) from a test participant’s 
interview in the training set (but training and test sets of 
vectors were mutually exclusive). Consequentially, the cross 
validation approach builds a model containing some of the 
psychological properties of the people who it classifies. In the 
second case (leave one pair out strategy), it sees no material 
of participants and relies on the commonality between their 
behavior and the behaviors of the participants used for 
training. We postulate that a large number of participants will 
build a larger general model, which will improve 
classification accuracy on previously unseen cases.  









Gender Ethnicity Gender Ethnicity 
1 M EU M A/A 100 57 
2 M A/A F EU 50 36 
3 M A/A F EU 50 100 
4 M EU F EU 90 100 
5 M A/A M EU 100 10 
6 M EU M EU 72 100 
7 M A/A F EU 100 100 
8 F EU F A/A 38 100 
9 M EU M EU 80 60 
Overall Accuracy (%) 75.55 73.66 
   It is also noted that for these initial experiments there is an 
insufficient amount of training data. Based on diversity of the 
participants (e.g. ethnicity, age, gender), a larger dataset 
would be more helpful to further generalize the classification 
networks. Despite of fair distribution of overall truthful and 
deceptive dataset (1.e. approximately 43000 vectors each), 
the unbalanced dataset in terms of ethnicity and gender might 
influence the deception classification network performance. 
For instance, the deceptive dataset consists of 4 Asian/Arabic 
participants compared to 13 of white EU. Likewise, in 
truthful scenario, there are 12 Male compared to only 3 
female participants. In addition, the data used in this study 
was raw (apart from removal of redundant duplicated 
vectors), had not been preprocessed and no tuning of the 
ANN deception classifiers had taken place.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
This paper has described the first stage in development of 
an automated deception detection system (ADDS) which will 
be developed further to be utilized within the iBorderCtrl 
(Intelligent Portable Control System). An experiment was 
designed and conducted using a number of truthful and 
deceptive scenarios to test the hypothesis that a machine 
based interviewing technique could be used to detect 
deception from non-verbal behaviour during an interview 
conducted by a static avatar. The dataset collected for this 
experiment contained image vectors from 32 participants and 
contained diversity in terms of gender and ethnicity. Raw 
experimental participant data was used to train artificial 
neural network deception classifiers using two train-test 
strategies. The un-optimized networks gave (as expected) 
high results when utilizing a cross validation train-test 
strategy, whilst obtaining an average classification of 75% on 
both truthful and deceptive interviews when using a leave a 
pair out strategy.  It was noted that given the diversity of the 
dataset, it might not have been large enough to train a 
classifier more effectively. Future work will involve 
capturing more data for diverse population representation and 
optimization of the neural network classifiers 
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